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For some years now, there has been a call for a new information order, a new international 
information order (NIIO), or a new world information and communication order(NWICO). 
Although the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) has 
served as a forum for NWICO demands, it has not been the only one. Several organizations, 
including church-sponsored organizations, now work on NWICO issues.' Many people have 
gotten to know about the NWICO through western media that warn of "UNESCO's 
protection racket" and "free press curbs"; few know about the translation of NWICO 
demands into programs of action by, among others, church groups. 
The piles of paper devoted to the NWICO discussion illustrate the contemporary 
information explosion. We can put our hands on reams of primary sources, since UNESCO 
runs true to international form by printing quantities of declarations, reports and other 
documents. We can find reams of secondary sources, too- uncoordinated accounts of the 
NWICO ranging from the serious to the silly. This addition to that corpus does not 
summarize the development of the NWICO debate; many summaries arealready available. 
Nor does it deal with the considerable efforts on the part of church groups "to make NWICO 
real" through their own programs. 2 Rather, it Iooks at recent church Statements !hat refer to 
the debate and at the manner in which they speak to it. 
I. The Churches Learn (Jl the Debate 
Church people took notice of what was then called the NIIO toward the end of the 1970s. A 
search for earlier interest reveals virtually nothing. Even Cees Hamelink, who has been at the 
vanguard of church thinking on the new order, made almost no mention of UNESCO-
sponsored work in his 1975 thesis. 3 When, in 1978, Harnelink acutally did publish a paper on 
the NIIO, Leopoldo Niilus of the World Council of Churches (WCC) introduced it by 
expressing his surprise that no major church-oriented communication organization had 
spoken out "loudly and clearly in defense of a New International Communication Order".4 
In 1980 Neville Jayaweera ofthe World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) 
chided the churches for their Iack of interest in the NIIO, noting that "amidst all (the) 
exchanges one Iooks in vain forasingledefinitive pronouncement from the churches". 5 The 
next year J ohn Bluck, thcn director of the WCC's communication department, observed that 
"despite their track record on other international issues of devclopment and peace, the 
churches have been late entrants into this forum". 6 
A "will to declare" would seem to have taken hold of some church people; thus possessed they 
were not content to Iet actions speak louder than words, through programs promotingajust 
information tlow. They wanted statements. No matter that the churches already had 
documents on file that could have been dusted off and applied to the NIIO and later the 
NWICO debate. People like Niilus, Jayaweera and Bluck expected new statements - hold 
new Statements. Those hoping to see the Vatican's 1971 pastoral instruction Communio et 
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Progressio brought into the discussion7 must have looked a little odd to the proponents of 
bold new statements. 
But the proponents probably dismissed the available statements too easily. Four older 
documents - including Communio et Progressio - had been singled out for criticism in 
Hamelink's thesis for what he considered their inadequate conceptual framework. Harnelink 
of course had his own idea as to what an adequate conceptual framework would Iook like, 
one that others might not accept. In order to pass judgment on the four Statements, however, 
Harnelink provided handy- and selective- summaries of them. Histhesis has certainly had its 
influence;g it further appears that many people replaced a reading of primary sources like 
Communio et Progressio with a reading of Hamelink's summaries. Communio et Progressio 
took years to write and expressed some matters of principle that the international discussion 
had not dated. Hamelink's few paragraphs, unfortunately, came to substitute for the 
document itself; along with his summary came the opinion that the document was totally 
inept. 
Besides the tendency to see earlier efforts as inadequate, there seems to have been little cross-
pollination when the time came to speak to the debate. John Paulll has now talked about the 
NWICO on several occasions- one ofthem having been his visit to UNESCO headquarters 
in 1980.9 There are at least half an dozen other statements that testify to the churches' 
acquaintance with the NWI CO: the study paper of the Asian Catholic Bishops (1982); the 
statement of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF, 1982); the staff paper on the NWICO 
endorsed by the W ACC's central committee ( 1982); the Sao Paulo document, produced by 
the Catholic media agency UNDA/ Latin America in cooperation with regional church 
Ieaders and other organizations ( 1982); the sixteen propositions ofthe Swiss churches on the 
evolution of the media ( 1983); and the WCC's statement on "communicating credibly", 
received by the Vancouver general assembly (1983). 10 Taking the WCC's product as an 
example, although it comes toward the end oftheburst of statements it gives no hint of other 
work on the issue. 
2. The Churches Speak to the Debate 
Different, yet similar steps were taken toward what some hoped would become brave 
declarations on the NWICO. When John Paulll visited UNESCO in 1980 he followed papal 
practice, begun with John XXIII's 1963 encyclical Pac·em in Terris, by stressing 
resemblances between church teaching and efforts by the international movement. For his 
part Jayaweera found that the churches and the NIIO advocates shared values like concern 
for truth and concern for the dignity of the human person. Bluck noted "the overlapping 
agendas (sie) of the new order and the ecumenical movement" and listed WCC programs on 
solidarity with the poor, sharing of resources, ensuring people's participation, and standing 
up for the integrity of culture. But we should observe, here, the shift of emphasis that already 
took place in these early efforts. Jayaweera and Bluck, especially, startedout by calling for a 
contribution to the international debate, and then indicated connections between church 
priorities and NWICO principles. They set up the project - and to a certain extent the 
resulting Statements- in such a way that church priorities were discussed at some length; then 
the NWICO discussion was summoned as an illustration of general interestinsuch matters. 
Those who initiated the movement toward statements did weil to note the possible Iiaisons 
between the churches' priorities and the NWICO demands for democratic communication. 
Their Dirtation with the NWICO was at the risk of bad press in the USA.1 1 And within the 
churches themselves the call for a new orderwas often interpreted as undue criticism of the 
old order. When, for example, the WCC's general assembly discussed that statement in 
plenary session, Walter Arnold of the German Evangelical Church thought the document 
too negative and led a movement to have it revised. Hans-Wolfgang Hessler, the director of 
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the same church's press service, later expressed these reservations about the ratified 
document. 12 Despite the criticism, however, the connections between church priorities and 
NWICO idealsareeasy enough to make. Since the 1920s notions of communication have 
actually developed in parallel to notions of Iove; thus, Jacques Ellul sees Martin Buber's 
dialogic, 1-Thou relationship as the best account of Christian Iove available. 13 The 
expressions of ideal communication - which occasionally peak through during NWICO 
discussions - should Iook at least vaguely familiar to groups that try to promote Christian 
Iove. In some ways, then, recognizing the links between church teaching/Christian valuesj 
ecumenical agenda and the NWICO vision of communication may have been courageous. In 
other ways it was short of being remarkable. 
For reasons that will become apparent below, we now Iook briefly at what the resulting 
statements have had to say about technology. They talk about it all right, but they often 
begin with their own problems -like the North American electronic church and the Western 
European deregularization of the media. They question technology and see too much of the 
message trimmed away in order to fit it into the media. The Asian bishops, for example, call 
for critical though on technology and more discriminating use. So do the L WF report, the 
Swiss churches' propositions and the WCC's statement. Once "on board" the discussion 
those church people criticize media technology in general: the L WF sees the need to reform 
technology and to remove it from current patterns of dominance; the Swiss churches warn of 
persistent imbalances in technology; and the WCC asks questions about uneven distribution. 
When technology and the NWICO are mentioned in (more or less) the same breath, the 
imbalance of technology appears as a grievance shared by NWICO advocates. For the Asian 
bishops the NWICO process is political in the noblest sense; it attempts to arrive at a more 
just world without recourse to violence. FortheL WF the NWICO addressed the problern of 
dominance but has, unfortunately, broken down into niggling and nagging. The Swiss 
churches offer a proposition on the NWICO, where it is seen as a movement to end unilateral 
dependencies. The WCC, meanwhile, Iists technology among a number of dilemmas and 
says those dilemmas have led the South to make NWICO demands that have been ignored. 14 
Thesestatements begin with their own problems vis ä vis technology and find fellow travelers 
in the NWICO movement. In an age where technology has become sacred, even this modest 
apostasy deserves some recognition. But despite the often avowed intention to say so mething 
to the international debate, it can be asked whether they really do that. Only the W ACC 
paper and the Sao Paulo document actually question the NWICO movement itself. The Sao 
Paulo group, in fact, unmasks a "hidden agenda". Alone, it refers to "false interpretations of 
the NWICO"; it goes on to say that "technological modernization benefits the TNCs, impairs 
the national economies and undermines political sovereignty"; it identifies an "unjust 
situation, aggravated by the aid strategies and the pseudo-transfer of technology". The Sao 
Paulo group, then, went from the noble principles where other groups stayed, to the grubby 
world of political/ commercial policy where things are harder. lt is there, precisely, that more 
creative skepticism on the part of churches could have made some difference to the NWICO 
discussion. 
3. The NWICO Hidden Agenda 
Today it is the fashion to Iook for conspiracies or, at least, "hidden agenda". The abundance 
of conspiracy theories or hidden agenda suspicions might seem like rampant paranoia. But 
the conspiracy and hidden agenda are occasionally real. 
For some time people have been especially careful about material on aid and development-
investigating it for conspiracy and hidden agenda. 15 Since part ofthe NWICO corpusfalls in 
that literary genre, it was only natural for it to be scrutinized. While people might criticize 
their analyses, Herbert Schillerand Cees Harnelink deserve some credit for having investi-
gated the NWICO materiaJ.16 Schillerand Harnelinksee the NWICO as devolving into a sort 
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of Marshall Plan for communication technology. The NWICO demands, to a certain extent, 
have been animated by good intentions. But their concrete realization has often found rich 
countries preparing trade 1 aid packages of transnational corporation (TN C) hardware and 
software for the poor ones. Like the original Marshai Plan, this set-up could help donors 
more than recipients - by creating markets and, therefore, employment at home. Such 
tradel aid schemes actually reinforce the TNC's domination of the present communication 
order; rather than create a new order we give the old order a face Iift. Or so the 
Schiller 1 Harnelink thesis goes. Like all good stories, this one has a twist in its plot: despite 
the anti-NWICO position of the United States' press and politicans, American-based TNCs 
stand to gain a Iot from the NWICO initiatives. 
Recent developments might cause some to question that plot line. In a new book on the 
churches and communications, Bluck suggests that the NWICO debate so upset the USA 
that in December 1983 it announced its withdrawal from UNESC0. 17 He implies that 
NWICO advocates nosed around the sacrosanct principle of press freedom too much, and 
that the USA responded by leaving the chief NWICO forum. He relates the two 
developments as cause and effect. This could have been what Leonard Sussman, director of 
the media-monitoring Freedom House had in mind when he told Inter Press Service 
reporters that the nebulous "ongoing discussion at UNESCO" on protectingjournalists had 
moved the American Congress to consider cutting off its contributions to the organization.1s 
But when the breakwas made it happened differently from what Bluck and Sussman suggest. 
The events of 1983 do seem to run in accordance with the Bluckl Sussman interpretation and 
against the Schiller 1 Harnelink analyses. A fact sheet circulated by the US embassy in Paris, 
in February 1984, certainly listed UNESCO discussions on press freedom as one reason for 
the withdrawal. But the closer we Iook at those events, the more press freedom seems a 
pretext rather than a central reason for the withdrawal. For one thing, if the press issue had 
been central we would have seen more consensus on the move. A (leaked) confidential review 
of the prob lern, sent from Assistant Secretary of State George Newell to Secretary of State 
George Shultz on 16 December 1983, shows there was no consensus at all. And some people 
who read that leaked document conclude that the impetus came not from congressional 
Ieaders- as Sussman would have it- but from a small group of Reagan appointees in the State 
Department itseJf.19 
Also revealing in this connection is the attitude of other western countries. Last November 
Ambassador Ernesto Thalmann, head of the Swiss delegation to UNESCO's twenty-second 
general conference, said that his country did not wish to see the organization deal with the 
free press issue. But in January Switzerland's national commission for UNESCO expressed 
regret at the US decision to withdraw, and cited among the disastrous consequences a 
reduced international cooperation in the field of communication. lt should also be observed 
that other countries with a strong free press tradition - like Britain, Canada, Australia, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and the Nordic countries- have distanced themselves from 
the US move and have tried to persuade the USA to remain in UNESCO. If other countries 
had perceived the threat to press freedom as central, they might have followed the USA out 
of the organization. Instead they have decided to stay. 
If the free press served as a pretext, for what was it a pretext? As everyone has had ample 
opportunity to observe, US politicians want to see the UN on what they consider the right 
track; they frequently play to crowd prejudices by attacking the UN system. Some highlights 
in that have been the USA's 1977-1980 absence from the International Labor Organization, 
and the 1983 exchange in New York when one US official offered to wave good-bye to the 
UN as it inexplicably sailed eastward into the sunset. And shortly after the announcement of 
the UNESCO pull-out rumors circulated in Geneva to the effect that the USA also planned 
to downgrade and reduce its participation in the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). Taken in this context, dissociation from UNESCO would deliver a messageto 
the UN system as a whole. UNESCO- because of the bad press it had gottenon the NWICO 
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debate- presented an ideal opportunity for an attack that would be especially popular in the 
run-up to a presidential election. Obviously, Bluck takes no note of this broader context. 
Should one accept the Schiller 1 Harnelink analyses, however, this message would have been 
delivered at a price: the loss of an opportunity to create markets for US technology. Since 
their books predate the US announcement to withdraw, Schillerand Harnelink have no 
chance to fit these pieces into the puzzle. But, in point offact, they do fit: Newell's December 
1983 memorandum to Shultz acknowledges that US standards and technological expertise 
frequently influenced UNESCO programs and created markets for US products and 
scientific equipment. But perhaps official participation had ceased to be as profitable as it 
once had been. People active in the UNESCO-sponsored International Program for 
Communication Development (IPCD) have linked the with drawal to the USA's inabilityto 
control that program. According to IPCD chairman Gunnar Garbo, speaking at the recent 
non-aligned movement media conference at New Delhi, the agency may have gone too far for 
some tastes.2° Garbo admitted that the USA and other western nations were willing enough 
to coordinate bilateral arrangements on communication technology, which we called 
trade/ aid schemes above. But they wanted to do this "without reducing the decisive power of 
the providers of resources". Quite likely those bilateral agreements could continue more 
efficiently on the outside and possibly represent what the USA called "other means of 
cooperation in education, science, culture and communication" in its announcement of 
withdrawal. To summarize: although UNESCO had offered a means of selling US 
technology in the past, those possibilities were decreasing and no Ionger enough to forestall 
US departure. The Americans could just as weil proceed via bilateral agreements where they 
would have their way, and not via UNESCOprograms that had become difficult to control. 
This has taken us far afield. But the verification of the Schiller-Harnelinkthesis surely calls 
recent church remarks on the NWICO into question. Did the proponents of statements on 
the NWICO- Iike Bluck, for instance- like the sound of the new order but miss the hidden 
agenda? lt Iooks as though this was generally the case. 
4. Where from Here? 
lt is not yet time to write the post martern on the churches and the NWICO. Work on 
NWICO issues continues, and there are still possibilities for contribution. But what, if 
anything, can the churches bring to the international discussion in its present state? 
At the outset this paper mentioned the importance of action. In their various programs 
churches experience first hand the difference between NWICO ideals and political/ commer-
cial reality. Their attempts to make idealsreal areeloquent in their own right, and would !end 
credibility to what they had to say later. Referring to the NWICO Robert White ofthe Centre 
for the Study of Communication and Culture warns of a "strong tendency for this issue tobe 
a debate of words, a discussion among elites". 21 He goes on to say that "we must see the 
NWICO in concrete terms and encourage self-criticism ... so that what we are doing doesn't 
defeat the words we speak about democratic communication". The churches first should 
apply their teachingjvaluesjpriorities- or their perception of the NWICO- to their own 
communication activities. And there are various indications that they are trying to do just 
that. 
A second contribution might come from the two thousand years worth of Statements the 
churches have made on communication- notjust from the sudden illuminations produced by 
those with a "will to declare". Statements have their place, but must be understood in an 
ecclesiological context where not only speaking but also hearing is essentiaJ.22 Earlier this 
paper mentioned the rather facile handling of Communio et Progressio in the rush toward 
bold new statements. That document obviously could never have pleased everyone: media 
practitioners and communication savants were bound to register discontent, if only because 
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their professions demanded that of them. But given the laborious process through which 
Communio et Progressio came into being, we might say that it has at least earned a reading. 
With respect to the newer documents, they need a reading as weil. Recently Paul Soukup 
lamented the fact that very little exchange goes on between those presently at work on the 
churches and communication;23 there seems to have been even less exchange between people 
drafting statements. 
Further formal contributions, on the other hand, might be more wary of hidden agenda in 
the various international machinations. The complexity of international problems has led 
many to question whether the churches have any competency in those areas at all. One 
could also ask whether the desire to find "signs of the times" or a fellowship among nations 
Ieads the churches to suspend their critical faculties when the time comes to address 
global issues. The way in which TNCs have profited from the NWJCO discussion should 
serve as ample illustration of malaise in the so-called international community. And the 
pressure exerted by the USA on the UN system- first UNESCO and now UNCT AD- could 
do with some (church) criticism. 
But the final point here has to do with technology. As would be expected, church work on 
the NWICO started with communication and not technology. Starting with communi-
cation, however, puts us in the mesmeric hold of the media. lt gives us no help when we 
confront the real issue: TNC technology. Instead of taking a color television set as a means 
of communication, we have to learn to take it as the product of a firm interested in 
technological rationalization and not in communication at all. lnstead of applauding that 
television as another neuron in the universal nervaus system, we should examine it for its 
appropriateness - technologically - to the recipient country as weil as its sustainability. 
Among other groups, the ecumenical movement has a long history of work on the 
technology issue; it had explored questions like political and commercial control of 
technology long before the WCC took an interest in the NWIC0.24 But when Bluck setout in 
1981 to Iist overlapping agenda he made r.o mention of WCC work on technology. This sort 
of oversight seems prevalent. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Anliegen dieses Beitrages ist es, die Bemühungen kirchlicher Kreise um die Verwirklichung einerneuen 
weltweiten Informations- und Kommunikationsordnung, ursprünglich eine Forderung der UNESCO, 
zu würdigen. 
Nachdem die Kirche zunächst in den 70er Jahren die Thematik nicht in den Blick nahm, erschwert durch 
eine verunglimpfende Zusammenfassung der Pastoralkonstitution "Communio et Progressio" (1971) 
durch Cees Harnelink (1975), wurde spätestens durch die Stellungnahme Johannes Pauls II. vor der 
UNESCO die Bedeutung einer neuen Weltinformationsordnung als kirchliches Anliegen 
hervorgehoben. 
Ähnlichkeiten in den Forderungen der NWICO und denen einiger Kirchen bestanden zum Teil in einer 
Kritik am privatwirtschaftlich organisierten Mediensystem und führten zu Widerspruch auf 
amerikanischer Seite. Kirchliche Medienexperten, besonders aus der Dritten Welt, beklagten die 
mangelnde technische Ausrüstung ihrer Länder für eine effektive Änderung der Informationspolitik.-
Die inhaltlichen Forderungen blieben weitgehend unberücksichtigt. 
Für ihren Rückzug aus der UNESCO führten die Amerikaner - im Zusammenhang mit der kirchen-
politischen Mediendiskussion - mangelnden Respekt gegenüber der Pressefreiheit an, während 
andere westliche Länder diese Meinung nicht teilten. Weitere Indizien erhärten den Verdacht, daß die 
verdeckten Gründe für den amerikanischen Rückzug eher wirtschaftlicher Art waren: die USA hatten 
einen bilateralen Handel an Informationstechnologie in die Dritte Welt aufgebaut, der ein Verbleiben in 
der UNESCO überflüssig machte. Die Kirchen scheinen diese Hintergründe nicht erkannt zu haben. 
Der Verfasser sieht nur dann eine Chance für die Kirche, eine kompetente Medienpolitik zu betreiben, 
wenn sie in Zukunft auch versteckte politische und wirtschaftliche Motive ihrer Partner berücksichtigt. 
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RESUME 
L'auteur en visage de presenter !es efforts faits par l'Eglise pour realiser un nouveau systeme d'informa-
tion et de communication tel que !'UNESCO l'a propose. 
L'Eglise qui, au debut, ne s'est pas pronond:e sur ce sujet, a ensuite adopti: une attitude comparable il 
celle de NWICO, pourtant, elle n'a pas bien compris !es raisons qui ont inciti: !es Etats-Unis il quitter 
!'UNESCO. Tandis que !es Etats-Unis expliquaient cela par Je fait que Je NWICO portait atteinte illa 
liberte de Ia presse, l'auteur pense plutöt a des raisons politiques et i:conomiques. 
RESOMEN 
EI deseo de esta presentaci6n es el de demarcar los esfuerzos de circulos eclesiasticos, como respuesta a 
una iniciativa de UNESCO, sobre Ia realizaci6n de un nuevo orden en informaci6n y comunicaci6n con 
sus posibilidades y limitaciones. 
La iglesia, luego de un silencio inicial, propugn6 una interpretaci6n similar a Ia de NWICO; asi por 
ejemplo, no entrevi6 los motivos de USA por abandonar Ia UNESCO. Segun el autor, antes que una 
violaci6n de Ia libertad de prensa por parte de NWICO, los motivos de USA fueron politicos y 
econ6micos. 
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